A common observation in most countries, developed or under developed, is that women are often at a disadvantage with respect to men in terms of their financial protection in old age. This is a result of multiple factors related to child caring, labor market participation and pension design. Pension systems are almost everywhere based on acquiring rights through employment related contributions. Women tend to contribute for shorter periods while taking care of children (or other dependent relatives); they often have a lower attachment to the formal labor markets than men; they usually retire earlier and they live longer. Pension systems in developed countries often include some elements that tend to compensate for these differences, through the form of minimum pensions or other non-contributory rights, different eligibility criteria (like years of contribution or minimum retirement age), unisex mortality tables (or defined benefits that are independent of gender, as in most DB schemes), etc. In this article, we analyze the different ways through which pension design in DC systems can affect pension entitlements of women, with a focus on the reality of a middle income developing country. To do so, we use labor and contribution histories of Chilean women to simulate the effect of alternative arrangements on women’s pensions and the pension gender gap.